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Healy v. James:
Official Campus Recognition for Student Groups
O N JUNE 26, 1972, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
handed down its decision in the case of Healy v. James,1 a de-
cision which will have great effect in the administrative review by
a college or university official of a petition by a student group for
recognition as a full-fledged campus organization. The Court de-
clared that such a petition carries with it the associational rights of
the group as protected by the first amendment, which can not be
subjected to the prior restraint of denial without a constitutionally
valid cause; placed the burden of proving such cause on the official;
and gave specific examples for the criteria to be used in the de-
cisional process.
Facts
In September, 1969, a group of students at Central Connecticut
State College (hereafter abbreviated as CCSC), a state-supported
institution, started procedures to organize a local chapter of the
Students for a Democratic Society (hereafter abbreviated as SDS)
and petitioned the Student Affairs Committee of the College for
official recognition, according to the College regulations. The re-
quest included the following statement of purpose for the group:
1. To provide a forum of discussion and self-education for
students developing an analysis of American society;
2. To serve as an agency for integrating thought with action
so as to bring about constructive changes; and
3. To endeavor to provide a coordinating body for relating
the problems of leftist students with other interested stu-
dents and groups on campus and in the community.'
The committee, during two meetings with the organizers, questioned
whether the group would be closely affiliated with the National SDS,
and whether the local group espoused all of the National's policies,
including the known policy of campus disruption. Both of these
issues were answered in the negative by the group's organizers, and
based on this claim of local independence, the committee voted six
to two to recommend that the petition and application be granted
by the President of the College, Dr. James. President James rejected
the application, stating that he could not recognize a group with
1408 U.S. 169 (1972).
2 Id. at 172. The full statement of purposes is given in the dissenting opinion to the Second
Circuit decision, 445 F.2d 1122, 1136-37 (2d Cir. 1971).
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policies (whether local or national) contrary to the approved Col-
lege policies, especially since the question of the group's national
affiliation was to him unclear.3
The effects of nonrecognition were felt in the restriction of
the group from the use of campus facilities for meetings and infor-
mational channels; because of these, the petitioning group filed suit
in the United States District Court for Connecticut, which found a
denial of procedural due process and granted a hearing.' Issues of
the independence from the national organization, and the disruptive
policies advocated and followed by the National SDS, were dis-
cussed at the hearing, and President James for a second time denied
official recognition to the CCSC-SDS. The case, returning to the
district court,' was ordered dismissed on the grounds that procedural
due process had been met, that the group had failed to meet the
burden of showing non-affiliation with the National organization,
and that possible associational rights had not been violated by the
College's denial of recognition to a group "likely to cause violent
acts of disruption."' The case was appealed to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals,' which affirmed the district court, two-to-one, on
the same line of reasoning, and certiorari was granted8 by the
Supreme Court to decide a novel factual presentation based on
established first amendment principles.
Right of Association
The Court in Healy found that it was apparent that campus
organizations and activities at state-supported schools were included
in the realm of constitutionally protected rights under the first
amendment, and that the denial of such rights was the first funda-
mental error made by the lower courts. "It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' This
concept of protected first amendment rights as applied to state-
supported schools" is one reiterated and stressed because the
3The statement is quoted in full in 408 U.S. at 174-75 n. 4.
4 Healy v. James, 311 F.Supp. 1275 (D.Conn. 1970).
5 Healy v. James, 319 F.Supp. 114 (D.Conn. 1970). See Baldwin, Methods of Social Control
of Academic Activists Within the University Setting, 14 ST. Louis L.J. 429, 456 (1970),
relating to administrative review procedures and techniques.
'Healy v. James, 319 F.Supp. 113, 116 (D.Counn. 1970).
7 Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971).
'Healy v. James, 404 U.S. 983 (1971).
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1960), quoted in Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
1t West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally, Dixon
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Schwartz, The Student, the
University, and the First Amendment, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 635, 646 (1970); Wright, The
Constitution Comes to the Campus, 22 VAND.L.REV. 1027 (1969).
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campus needs and requires academic freedom to remain the "mar-
ketplace of ideas";" by its very purpose, a college or university is
(or should be) a melting pot of differing and conflicting ideas
molded into an education.
The first amendment rights here in question include the free-
doms of speech, assembly, and petition, and the implicit right of
association, to further and enhance personal and group beliefs. 2
There is also a right to receive information and ideas;"3 "[t]his is
not surprising when one considers what value the right to free speech
would have if the right to hear such speech could be foreclosed."' 4
Of course, these rights must be balanced against the needs of
the college administration to keep and maintain an orderly campus, 5
and the rights of students, faculty, and other persons (townspeople,
etc.) who do not advocate the ideals or methods of the group in
question. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,'6 these needs were stressed, as the Court recognized
. , the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
the States and of the school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools. 7
College officials have a wide discretionary range in the operation
and management of the school, 8 including reasonable rules and
regulations,'9 but such regulation must be related to educational
11 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
7
2 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972), citing Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S.
1 (1970), and Louisiana ex. rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). Associa-
tional rights were officially recognized by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Han-
over Twp. Fed. Tchrs. Local 1954 v. Hanover Comm. School Corp., 457 F.2d 456 (7th Cir.
1972).
13 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
14 American Civil Liberties Union of Va., Inc. v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893, 896
(W.D. Va. 1970).
75This has been called an inherent right of administrative officials in their official capacities.
See Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969); Speake v.
Grantham, 317 F.Supp. 1253 (S.D.Miss. 1970); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.Supp. 228
(S.D.W.Va.), afftd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Educ., 281 F.Supp. 747 (W.D.La. 1968); Butoy v. Smiley, 281 F.Supp. 280 (D. Colo.
1968); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F.Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967);
Hanger v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 39 App. Div. 2d 253, 333 N.Y.S. 2d 571
(1972).
16393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17 Id. at 507.
18 Norton v. Discipline Committee of E. Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cit. 1969);
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969); Clemson Univ.
Vietnam Moritorium Comm. v. Clemson Univ., 306 F.Supp. 129 (D.S.C. 1969).
19 Center for Participant Educ. v. Marshall, 337 F.Supp. 126 (N.D. Fla. 1972). For example,
at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, a campus regulation required all persons,
whether students, non-students, faculty, staff, or invitee, to carry a valid identification card
(Continued on next page)
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objectives, 2 and must not abridge constitutional right or be arbi-
trary or capricious.2
There is a concept ancillary to the student organization-admin-
istration dichotomy which evolves from the purpose of a college or
university. "The freedoms of speech and assembly, while occupying
a 'preferred position' among constitutional liberties, may not be
exercised on public property without regard to its primary usage.
'22
That education is the primary role of a university is granted and
conceded by all sides; the debate is how this education is to be
presented and taught, and in what medium or form. In other words,
what ammunition is to be included in the arsenal of academics?
23
Although the state has the "power to preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated, '24 there
may be some forms of academics on campus which an administra-
tion may not in any circumstances prohibit. This would, however,
appear to be an equal protection argument: once certain non-
academic or non-scholastic activities (in a strictly traditional sense)
are permitted on campus, any other such activities must also be
permitted to function on campus, subject to reasonable restraints
governed by the application of first amendment safeguards. 5 How-
ever, a distinction may be drawn between local groups petitioning
for use of campus facilities for local students, and a group bring-
(Continued from preceding page)
necessary for admission to any campus facility. The regulation was held valid as a reason-
able regulation, related to the necessity of the maintenance of order on campus. See Smith
v. Ellington, 334 F.Supp. 90 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); see also Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d
873 (5th Cit. 1970).
10 American Civil Liberties Union of Va., Inc. v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893, 896
(W.D.Va. 1970); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F.Supp. 613, 618 (M.D.Ala.
1967); Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions, 45 F.R.D. 133, 137 (WD. Mo.
1968).
21 Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.Supp. 228, (S.D.W.Va. 1968); Connelly v. University of Vt. &
State Agric. College, 244 F.Supp. 156 (D.vt, 1965).
22 Stacy v. Williams, 306 F.Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
23See, e.g., in regard to the teaching of evolution theory, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968). In regard to oaths of allegiance and inquiry as to membership in subversive and
similar activities and organizations, the Court in Kcyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967), stated at 603: "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers con-
cerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." In regard to prior review by
school administrators of school-sponsored literary magazines and pamphlets, see Stanley v.
Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Fujishima v. Board of Educ.,
460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cit. 1971); Lee
v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ, 440
F.2d 803 (2d Ciu. 1971); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F.Supp. 456 (E.D. N.Y. 1972); Egner
v. Texas City Indep. School Dist., 338 F.Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
24 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
25American Civil liberties Union of Va., Inc. v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893, 896
(W.D.Va. 1970); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F.Supp. 963, 971 (N.D. Miss, 1969).
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ing in a number of persons from outside the local campus, with an
increased threat of disruption.
The actual instances in Healy abridging fundamental rights
included the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards and the
campus newspaper for informational purposes, the denial of the
use of campus facilities for meetings,27 and the denial of "the ad-
ministrative seal of official college respectability."21 The Court was
able to give these instances of denial of rights great weight be-
cause the "Constitution's protection is not limited to direct inter-
ference with fundamental rights, 29 and because such indirect action
(subtle government interference) with the effect of curtailment or
prohibition of protected rights was impermissible. The fact that
the group could function off-campus to some degree was not con-
trolling, because it is the "character of the right, not the limitation"
which is important," and this limitation was such to deny rights
to the group. The lack of meeting space and communication channels
in the College would undoubtedly impede the right to the group to
effectively carry on many of its purposes, and the lack of official
approval would certainly affect membership and interaction with
recognized campus groups. 1
Having established that a fundamental, constitutionally pro-
tected right was involved and was invaded, the Court moved to the
t5 Clcmson Univ. Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Clemson Univ., 306 F.Supp. 129 (D.S.C.
1969).
27 For example, a meeting in the campus coffee shop was disbanded by the college officials
after president James' official rejection on November 6 because "CCSC SDS is not a duly
recognized college organization," Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 176-77 (1972). In Lieber-
man v. Marshall, 236 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1970) the Florida Supreme Court affirmed an in-
junction prohibiting a student group denied official campus recognition from using campus
facilities, stating that under the facts, no first amendment rights were denied. See also Na-
tional Strike Info. Cntr. v. Brandeis Univ., 315 F.Supp. 928 (D. Mass. 1970).
28Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 182 (1972), cting the second district court opinion, 319
F.Supp. 113, 116 (DConn. 1970).
I9 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972).
30 American Civil Liberties Union of Va., Inc. v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893, 898
(W.D.Va. 1970), citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
31 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 176 (1972). The result of such a denial of recognition by
an administrative procedure may well have a chilling effect upon the expression of politically
motivated fundamental rights. See Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City Council, 310
F.Supp. 457 (E.D. Tex. 1970). Thete are very real sanctions involved, including academic
probation and expulsion from the university. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.
1969). These sanctions could very well be sufficient under the edicts of Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and Keyshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
Since there is a great "likelihood" that on-campus recruitment of members or other activities
will bring sanctions, this "[c~hilling may justify the relaxation of rules which inhibit the
mitigation of constitutional claims in the federal courts." Davis v. Ichord, 442 F.2d 1207,
1214 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L.
REV. 808, 809 (1969).
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regulation and enforcement process of this right in relation to the
action taken by the College.32
Burden of Proof
The second fundamental error of the lower court decisions was
related to the burden of proving that the proposed CCSC-SDS was
an acceptable organization entitled to recognition by the College.
After wending its way through the administrative functions
and hearings at the college, the application for recognition was
denied by President James on the grounds that since the local group
was allied to the National SDS, whose policies were abhorrent to
the College and its policies, the local chapter had to prove with
sufficient evidence that they would not follow the national policy of
campus disruption.3 Having failed to so prove, the students' appli-
cation was rejected. In essence, President James and the lower courts
placed on the petitioning group the burden of proving that they
were an acceptable organization for official recognition by the
College. This, the Court declared, was not the proper procedure:
". .. once petitioners had filed an application in conformity with
the requirements, the burden was upon the College administration
to justify its decision of rejection." 4 By so placing the burden of
proof, the College administration had to show valid and cognizable
reasons for rejecting the group,35 and since the rights of the group
were of fundamental first amendment weight, a constitutionally-
recognized basis was needed to deny such rights.
The reason for this shift was that the rejection of the appli-
cation for recognition was found to be a prior restraint of a fun-
damental right of the petitioners. 3 6 A prior restraint is the decision
by an official to withhold or prohibit activities protected by the
constitution before their actual happening, based on the actions of
affiliated or similar bodies, or on mere speculation that the actions
32 In Healy, applicants did not question the procedural or substantive application requirements
for official recognition. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183-84 n. 11, 193 (1972). However,
it is implicit that procedural due process be met, to allow a full and fair application process.
While the process may be valid without granting a hearing, as in Merkey v. Board of
Regents, 344 F.Supp. 1296, 1304 (N.D. Fla. 1972), an application scheme must be
made public, must include an unbiased and impartial decision maker per Winnich v.
Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1972), and Wasson v. Trotieridge, 382 F.2d 807,
813 (2d Cit. 1967), and must be applied equally to all applicants.
33 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183-84 (1972).
3
4Id- at 184, citing Law Stuldents Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.E. 154
( 1971), and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
3"5[W]hen the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred . . . due process demands
that the speech be unencumbered until the State comes forward with sufficient proof to
justify its inhibition." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958).
36 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F.Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). See generally
Comment, Withholding Official College Recognition from Radical Student Groups: A
Denial of First Amendment Rights, 57 IOWA L. REV. 937, 945-48 (1972).
[Vol. 22:373
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will be disruptive, or that the goals or policies are not compatible
with the norms of the larger or controlling group. The concept of
prior restraint, as applied to state action in Near v. Minnesota,3
encompasses the entire first amendment, including the right to
associate, and certain tests and indicia have evolved to evaluate
the effect of the prior restraint.
• . . [I]n order to withstand constitutional attack, prior
restraints must be narrowly drafted so as to suppress only
that [action] which presents a "clear and present danger"
of resulting in serious substantive evil which a university
has a right to prevent.38
This is the classic test given in Schenck v. United States," formu-
lated in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes. In a review of the "clear
and present danger" doctrine, Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,4" reaffirmed the basic tenets of the Schenck
test, in holding that more than mere advocacy must be necessary
for restraint or punishment of the exercise of protected first amend-
ment rights; there must be action in furtherance of the advocated
position or objective. This advocacy includes abstract ideas as well
as political action and only loses its first amendment protection
when some overt act is caused by and is inseparable from the ad-
vocacy, 41 which act "materially and substantially interfere[s] with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school."42
The activities in question in Healy were found to be constitu-
tionally protected. Therefore, while the college had "a legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on the campus,"43 and could under
certain circumstances restrain such activities by denying official
recognition, the Court stated that "a 'heavy burden' rests on the
college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action."" This
burden was not met.
37283 U.S. 697 (1931).
38Stacy v. Williams, 306 F.Supp. 963, 971 (N.D.Miss. 1969); see Molpus v. Fortune, 432
F.2d 916 (5th Cit. 1970); Stacy, Mississippi's Campus Speaker Ban: Constitutional Con-
siderations and the Academic Freedom of Students, 38 Miss.L.J. 488 (1967).
3'249 U.S. 47 (1919); see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
40 395 U.S. 444, 450-57 (1969).
11 Id. at 456-57.
4 fBurnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cit. 1966), cited in Tinker v. Des Moiaes
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
43 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972).
"Id. at 184; see Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931); Poxon v. Board of Educ., 341 F.Supp. 256
(E.D. Calif. 1971).
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In sum, the reasons for the reversal of the lower court deci-
sions in Healy were that the courts made fundamental errors in
"discounting the existence of a cognizable first amendment interest
and misplacing the burden of proof."45 However, the Court examined
in detail the possible grounds for the denial of recognition to the
CCSC-SDS, and based the order of remand on one of the four
grounds discussed. The balance of this comment deals with the
Healy bases of denial together with rationales of related cases.
Justifications for Non-Recognition
Affiliation
The first justification for non-recognition presented to the
Court in Healy regarded the affiliation ties of the local group to the
National SDS organization.46 President James concluded that the
ties of the local group to the National, with no proof to the
contrary, would impart the National's unsavory reputation of in-
stigating and associating with disruptive campus activity, notwith-
standing denials by the local group as to any dependence on the
National SDS for either ideological or organizational backing.4 7 The
local group insisted they merely wanted to use the name of SDS for
its recognition factor as a well-known "leftist organization" in its
drive for members. 8 The answer to such "guilt by association" was
clear to the Court: ". . . the Court has consistently disapproved
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights
and privileges solely because of a citizen's association with an un-
popular organization,"" when used as a basis for the denial of first
amendment rights. "The government has the burden of establishing
a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims," 0
which is the burden of disproving a prior restraint; this President
James failed to accomplish. Affiliation in Healy was not a sufficient
ground of denial of recognition.
Philosophy
The second justification for denial of recognition given by Presi-
dent James in Healy was based on the theory that since the local
group was affiliated with the National SDS, the National philosophy
must necessarily be included in the local SDS philosophy. President
James found the National philosophy to be understandably abhor-
4 5 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1972).
"Id. at 185-86.
0 1d. at 186-87.
1id. at 173 n. 3.
49 Id, at 185-86, citing Ujited States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
"
t Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
[Vol. 22.373
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rent and ". .. counter to the official policy of the college" ;51 he could
not ". . sanction an organization that openly advocates the de-
struction of the very ideals and freedoms upon which the academic
life is founded."52 The Court found that the state, acting through
the College, could not restrict the expression of such philosophy
". . simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to
be abhorrent." 53 Quoting Mr. Justice Black:
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the
freedoms of speech, press, petition, and assembly guar-
anteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the
ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the
ideas we cherish.54
Thus the Court found that not only must the mere advocacy of views
unpopular or contra to the mainstream of thought in our society be
tolerated, but that any denials of advocacy of such views them-
selves must be restricted and repealed, so as to ensure the freedoms
of following popular advocates.
Disruptive Influence
The third basis for non-recognition detected by the Court in
President James' action was ". . . that he based rejection on a con-
clusion that this particular group would be a 'disruptive influence
at CCSC'."55 However, for the rejection to be valid under this con-
clusion the facts of the case must be put through an examination
designed to indicate whether there is possible disruption in mag-
nitude outweighing the protection of first amendment rights, so as
to permit a prior restraint. The test is the distinction ". . . between
mere advocacy and advocacy directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such
action,"5 or, in other words, between verbal (philosophical) ad-
vocacy and advocacy plus imminent disruptive (physical) action.57
1' Id. at 187.
21d. at 187.
11J. at 187-88.
5 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961).
" Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 188 (1972).
16Id. at 188, quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). It is not the "vol-
ume" of the advocacy, but the quality; ". . . abstract discussion is not the only species of
communication which the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigor-
ous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion." NAACP v_ Button,
371 US. 415, 429 (1963).
37 To determine the distinction, one must differentiate ... the mere abstract teaching
of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence; (it] is not
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There
msst be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in
the future which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the
otherwise ambiguous theoretical material regarding [such advocacyl, and to justify that
(Continued on next page)
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Associational activities need not be tolerated where they
infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or sub-
stantially interfere with the opportunity of other students
to obtain an education. 8
Not only must the existence of a disruptive factor be shown to
validate the state interest, but the action taken to regulate the dis-
ruptive factor must be reasonably related to the interests sought to
be protected, and the first amendment restrictions applied in the
minimal amount necessary to further the state interest. 9
The Court in Healy found no facts from which it could adduce
that there was a danger of disruption of the college.9 When asked
if he would disrupt a class, a committee member of the CCSC-SDS
replied: "Our action would have to be dependent on each issue ...
Impossible for me to say."61 Other answers to violence-oriented ques-
tions were equally vague, evasive, or unresponsive, depending on
the vantage-point of the observer. Even the Dean of Student Affairs,
during the court-ordered hearings, admitted that there was no
question raised as to the intimation of the contemplation of illegal
or disruptive practices. 2 The local SDS group, while fostering un-
popular and "abhorrent" ideas, was only in the verbal advocacy stage,
and therefore was protected by the first amendment in the asso-
ciational right.
Prior Affirmation of Reasonable University Rules
The fourth rationale for the denial of recognition given in
Healy was that of ". . . unwillingness to be bound by reasonable
school rules governing conduct,"63 or where a "group . ..reserves
(Continued from preceding page)
such a call to violence may fairly be imputed to the [organization] as a whole, and not
merely to some narrow segment of it." Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961).
But the converse is not necessarily true; although a large national organization may ad-
vocate violent action, a local affiliate need not, and to impart such a connotation on the
purpose of a local organization may be grossly unfair, especially in light of the protected
rights involved.
S5 Mealy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
" ealy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189-90 n. 20 (1972); see also United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
60 Contrast Merkey v. Board of Regents, 344 F.Supp. 1296 (N.D. Fla. 1972), wherein uni-
versity officials denied recognition to a proposed Young Socialist Alliance student group.
Unlike Healy, the court found a valid denial from a proper form of review and proper
standards, as there were sufficient facts showing ". . . an imminently present threat of ma-
terial disruption to the maintenance of the orderly education processes of the university."
Id. at 1306. Besides advocating disruptive practices, the applicants in Merkey had already
"... been involved in disruptive activities both on and off the university campus." Id. at
1307.
61Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 173 (1972).
6Jd. at 190.
63 d. at 191.
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the right to violate any ... campus rules with which it disagrees.""'
Central Connecticut State College had adopted a "Student Bill of
Rights," including a section carefully following the Brandenburg
standards delineating verbal advocacy from advocacy coupled with
the dangers of action. 5 The Court held that reasonable regulations
of first amendment rights, "[j I ust as in the community at large . . .
[including] . . . the time, the place, and the manner in which
student groups conduct their speech-related activities, must be
respected."66 One such restriction might be that prospective groups
seeking official college recognition affirm in advance that the group
intends to comply with and abide by reasonable campus regulations
and conform to reasonable standards regarding conduct.67 Failing
to find in the record any such rule in CCSC recognition procedures
and regulations, and finding ambiguity on the part of the petitioning
group to so affirm, the Court remanded the case for further recon-
sideration of this point.
It does not appear that the Court is making prior affirmation
a mandatory part of the recognition process, in that if there is no
such regulation in the college administrative function, the petition-
ing group need not so affirm. However, this could be one avenue for
denial of recognition in the future, and could open a new door to
other similar "reasonable" regulations for the grant of official col-
lege recognition.
Equal Protection
An equal protection basis was utilized in American Civil
Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc. v, Radford College"5 as the deter-
minative criteria for the official recognition of a student group.
To say that the "role and purpose" of the Young Republican
and Young Democrative Club is within the "scope and ob-
jectives" [of the college] and in the next breath say that
"Id. at 194.
"Th entice "Student Bill of lRights" is set out in an Appendix to the majority opinion of
the circuit court, Realy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122, 1135-39 (2d Cit. 1971). Part V, Section E
contains the pertinent regulation: "College students and student organizations shall have
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, . . . and to support
causes by orderly means, They may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings
and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have the right to deprive others of the
opportunity to speak or be heard, to invade the privacy of others, to damage the property
of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operations of the college, or to interfere with
the tights of others."
6Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192-93 (1972).
"Id. at 193. The standards must not be vague or overbroad. Seo also Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F.Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
315 F.Supp. 893 (W.D.Va. 1970).
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the ACLU is without does not seem to treat with equality
the petition of the ACLU Students. 9
The court based its reasoning on the fact that the university may
not arbitrarily exclude certain organization "when such facilities
have been made previously available to outside organizations.""
Once approval has been granted to certain political groups,
approval of equal magnitude must be given to all, and denial based
on the views held by the group would be blatant political censor-
ship.71 Although the court stressed that the university has wide
discretion in administering and regulating the school, the students
also had a right to be recognized absent some compelling reason, in
the nature of disruptive influences, not to be so recognized. Finding
no such constitutionally permissible ground for the exclusion of the
ACLU, the court allowed Radford College leave to comply with the
order.
Litigious Organization
An off-shoot of the third Healy rationale, that of disruptive
practices by campus organizations, was discussed in University of
Southorn Mississippi Chapter of the Mississippi Civil Liberties
Union v, University of Southern Mississippi." In this case, the
Fifth Circuit recognized and applied the Tinker standards to a
local American Civil Liberties Union group which was denied official
recognition as a student organization, which "meant that the Chap-
ter could neither participate in University-approved student activ-
ities nor conduct student activities on campus on its own initiative."
Although the University had declined to issue a statement of reasons
for the denial, the district court found that the only reason with
"barely tenable" merit was the threat of litigation, and the history
of the National organization to bring litigation. The only type of
litigation which could meet the Tinker standards of disruption would
be litigation conducted in bad faith, vexatious and frivolous litiga-
tion harrassing school or state officials or functions. There was no
showing of such types of litigation, and the decision of the Uni-
versity was reversed. The court stressed that:
69 American Civil Liberties Union of Va., Inc., v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893, 898
(W.D.Va. 1970). "The actual issue is whether a state institution such as Radford can deny
recognized status and whatever privileges and rights flow from that status to the A.C.L.U.
when it has accorded that status to other organizations which have complied with the pre-
scribed procedures." Id, at 897.
70 American Civil Liberties Union of Va., Inc,, v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893, 896
W.D. Va. 1970).
71 Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F.Supp. 188, 196 (M.D. Ala.), af'd, 412 F2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1969).
12452 F.2d 564 (ith Cir. 1971).
7'Id. at 565-66,
[Vol. 22:373
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss2/13
HEALY V. JAMES
[s]erious, bona fide litigation carried on by a minority
group as a peaceful means of guaranteeing its rights in a
larger community is a form of expression and association
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.74
Disciplinary Action
What would the effect of later disruptive practices have on the
official college recognition of a student organization? The Court
hinted as to the effect in Healy: disciplinary action, in that "recog-
nition, once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners
fail to respect campus law."7 5 The power to suspend an organization
from university approval is implicit in the Healy concept of prior
affirmation of campus rules in that this affirmance is one of the
prerequisites for a group to include in its rules before official recog-
nition is granted. Campus disruption which violates campus law
would be a breach of the agreement made by a group to the col-
lege and would be a constitutionally valid basis for denial of official
recognition to a campus group.
This view was taken in American Civil Liberties Union of
Virginia v. Radford College,7 6 wherein the court stated that while
the student group has a right to be recognized, "[ilf their conduct
as a campus organization is unduly disruptive of the orderly func-
tioning of the institution, this court will be the first to reconsider
its decision.""
The type of disruption necessary is shown by the standards in
Tinker: ". . . conduct which materially disrupts classwork or in-
volves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others ... ,"7
or where there is some adverse action coupled with the advocacy of
an "abhorrent" philosophy.79
Examples of disruptive behavior run on a continuum from in-
significant, to necessarily sufficient cause for disciplinary action. An
act classified as insubordination of a student to a college rule found
4JId. at 567, citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
75 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 n.24 (1972).
"1315 F.Supp. 893 (W.D.Va. 1970).
77 Id. at 899; cited affirmatively in tke coneurring opinion of Judge Coleman in University of
So. Miss. Chapter, Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University of So. Miss., 452 F.2d 564, 562
(5rh Cir. 1971).
"Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
"9The action must be of the "lawless" type: ". . [t]he Constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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unreasonable and violative of expression rights0 is clearly insuffi-
cient to remove the official recognition from a group. Student
organizations may not be restrained when there is insufficient evi-
dence to show unauthorized and disruptive activities. 1 The wearing
of armbands 8 or buttons 3 by a group is not in itself disruptive, and
additional facts must be shown to prove that school functions were
hampered or interfered with, by such expression.84 The distribution
of inflammatory literature "calculated to cause disturbance and dis-
ruption of school activities" is not protected speech and may be the
basis for a repeal of recognition. 5 A demonstration disrupting a
football game and invading the rights of many patrons, including
the president of the university, may be a disruptive activity which
could cause the removal of recognition. s6 The question is, of course,
what degree of action is violent and what action is necessary to
disrupt a university; these issues, affecting first amendment rights,
must be decided on a case-by-case analysis of facts and circumstancesY
SDickey v. Alabama Stare Bd. of Edui., 27 3 FSupp. 613 (M.D.Ala. 1967), vacated as moot
sub eaom., Troy State University v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cit. 1968). Dickey over-
ruled the "Adams rule," which stated that no criticism of state or college officials could
be made, and that violation of the rule was insubordination, subject to dismissal. Dickey,
supra, 273 F.Supp. at 616, 618. ". . . [A] state may not foreclose exercise of constitu-
tional rights by mere labels." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
81 University of So. Miss. Chapter, Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University of So. Miss., 452
F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971); Scoggin v. Lincoln Univ., 291 F.Supp. 161 (W.D.Mo. 1968);
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F.Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
82 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). This right has
been held to include teachers as well as students. James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566
(2d Cir. 1972).
8aBumside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
' Blackwell v. Issaqueaa County Ed. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), where a high
degree of commotion was caused by the distribution and wearing of the buttons; see alo
Guzich v. Drebus, 305 F.Supp. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
95 Norton v. Discipline Committee of E. Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cit. 1969);
see Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971), discussing overbroad
and deficient administrative policy statement.
86 Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.Supp. 228 (S.D.W.Va. 1968); see also Esteban v. Central Mis-
souri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969); civil protest during an alumni dinner,
resulting in disciplinary measures to students, was the subject of Lowery v. Adams, 344
F.Supp. 466 (W.D. Ky. 1972). In Stacy . Williams, 306 F.Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Miss.
1969), a list of forbidden subjects for guest speakers, but also applicable to removal of
recognition, is given:
1 . . . .
2. willful destruction or seizure of the institution's buildings or other property;
3. disruption or impairment, by force, of the institution's regularly scheduled
classes or other educational functions;
4. physical harm, coerdon, intimidation, or other invasion of lawful rights of the
institution's officials, faculty members, or students; or
5. other campus disorders of violent nature.
These standards are based on the restriction in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945): "Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition to allow the widest room for discus-
sion, the narrowest range for its restriction, particularly when this right is exercised in
conjunction with peaceable assembly."
a7 Dennis v. United Stares, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951); see Blackwell v. Issaquena County
Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cit. 1966), for such an analysis in the environment
of a public high school.
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If a recognized organization does violate its agreement to affirm
rules or is disruptive in a form thought by college officials to be
subject to discipline, procedural due process 8 must be granted the
group before its recognition may be removed. "In that event, the
recognition granted the [group] could be challenged and withdrawn
in a fair proceeding based upon evidence of actual, and not vaguely
predictive, misconduct.'' 9 The requirements of procedural due process
in this matter would be adequate notice and a fair and impartial
opportunity to be heard.9 '
Conclusion
It would appear that the import of Healy may be stated as an
affirmation of the protection of first amendment rights on the cam-
pus, the establishment of guidelines for decisions made in the process
of official recognition of new campus organizations, and approval or
disapproval of restrictions which may be imposed by a college or
university on a student group. These guidelines could be expanded
in application to any administrative body granting privileges to a
proposed organization. Non-compliance with the affirmed rule would
be a sole basis for withdrawal of the privilege. The "prior affirma-
tion of college rules and regulations" concept, as put forth by the
Court, would appear to be merely an additional procedure in the
recognition process and an additional ground for the removal of
recognized status from a group; a violation of such rules would be
"prosecuted" whether or not the group affirmed the rules prior to
recognition, and in any event procedural due process must be met
in the removal process, and the burden of proof remains on the
persons questioning the protection of the first amendment (in this
case, the college).
Jeffrey L. Terbeekt
"1 For a description of procedural due process in a university setting, see Norton v. Discipline
Committee of E. Tenn. State Univ., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969); Due v. Florida A. &
M. Univ., 233 F.Supp. 396, 402 (N.D.Fia. 1963).
'9 University of So. Miss. Chapter, Miss. Civil Liberties Union v. University of So. Miss., 452
P.2d 564, 567 (5th Or. 1971).
"Dixon v. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); see Knight v. State Bd. of
Educ., 200 F.Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
t Law Review Editor; third year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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